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The Trouble We Have with the Iraqis Is US*: A
Proposal for Alternative Dispute Resolution in
the New Iraq
JOSHUA F. BERRY**
On May 1, 2003, President Bush announced that major combat
operations in Iraq had ended.1 To the casual observer, the events in Iraq since
that time suggest otherwise. There are daily reports of firefights, bombings,
and killings. From May 1, 2003 to September 1, 2004, there were 838
American fatalities.2 Even the recent June 28, 2004, transfer of sovereign
* Adapted from EDWARD T. HALL, BEYOND CULTURE 211 (1976): "Individuals who
are willing to let others be themselves without paying a dreadful price for it are very rare
indeed. There has been some progress here and there, yet one seldom hears the remark:
'The trouble I have with him is me."'
** B.S., United States Military Academy, 1998; J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State
University Moritz College of Law, 2005. I would like to thank Professors Ellen E.
Deason and Mary Ellen O'Connell for their comments and suggestions on my work.
Most importantly, I must thank my beautiful wife Laura for patiently tolerating the large
amount of time I put into this Note. As a final comment, the situation in Iraq changes
every day and every effort has been made to keep pace with current events. Indeed, from
the commencement of this Note in November 2003 until publication in March 2005, the
changes in Iraq are staggering. Due to publication and editorial constraints, neither the
recent battles in Fallujah and Najaf, nor the January 2005 elections were discussed, but
these events will certainly provide valuable insight into how culture affects dispute
resolution in Iraq. I hope that these recent events will help provide more practical insight
on how Americans can better resolve conflict with the Iraqis, so that ultimately, a
peaceful democracy exists in Iraq.
I David E. Sanger, Bush Declares 'One Victory in a War on Terror', N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 2003, at Al. Bush flew to the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln and
announced to returning sailors from the Persian Gulf that "major combat operations in
Iraq have ended," and that "in the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have
prevailed." Id.
2 This casualty total is current as of September 1, 2004. See Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) U.S. Casualty Status, at http://www.dod.mil/news/Sep2004/d20040901cas.pdf (last
visited Sept. 17, 2004); see also Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, at
http://icasualties.org/oif/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2004); Special Report: War in Iraq:
Forces: U.S. & Coalition/Casualties, at
http://www.cnn.comVSPECIALS/2003/iraq/forces/casualties/index.html (last visited Sept.
17, 2004). There are a number of statistics available on American casualties in Operation
Enduring Freedom and this number (838) reflects the total number of American fatalities.
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power to the Iraqi Interim Government did not quell the bloodshed. 3 Against
this background of violence and apparent unrest, reconstruction efforts in
Iraq receive little media coverage.4 Media reports from Iraq tend to have a
"police blotter" mindset, often ignoring positive reports of reconstruction and
democratic progress in Iraq, and contributing to the perception that Iraq is a
lawless society.5
Those who study and practice law might question the status of the justice
and legal systems in Iraq. Those who have spent time in the Middle East or
anticipate journeying there as part of an American or international operation
might want to know more about the intricacies of the government and legal
system. In a country that is divided among various ethnic and religious
groups, how are everyday conflicts resolved between the local population
and the American-led Multi-National Force (MNF)?
This Note discusses the need for mediation as an alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) mechanism in Iraq, the role that dispute resolution plays in
Islamic society, and how persons from a non-Islamic background should
approach mediation in predominately Islamic Iraq. This Note discusses why
mediation is the most suitable method for ADR in Iraq, and proposes
traditional Muslim sulh as a means for resolving disputes between Iraqis and
non-Iraqis. 6 This Note focuses on Iraq, but it is also applicable to
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) U.S. Casualty Status, supra. Six hundred twenty-one
(621) of these fatalities are from hostile fire, 217 are non-hostile fire casualties. Id.
3 From June 29, 2004 to July 30, 2004, there were 58 Americans killed in action in
Iraq. Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, supra note 2; See Somini Sengupta, Violence Surges
in Baghdad and Sunni Area to the West, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at A8.
4 See Christopher Marquis, U.S. Plans to Offer Official Coverage of Iraq Directly to
Viewers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2003, at A26 (discussing a Pentagon plan to make
briefings from Iraq directly available to networks, cable stations, and government
agencies in order to help inform the American public about the progress in Iraq).
5 See Jeff Johnson, Democrats Say Establishment Media's Iraq Reporting Biased,
CNSNews.Com, Sept. 24, 2003, at
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewPentagon.asp?Page=\Pentagon\a-chive\200309\PEN2003
0924a.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2004); Hans Nichols, Press Slants Iraq News, THE
HILL, Sept. 23, 2003, available at http://www.hillnews.comnews/092303/press.aspx (last
visited Sept. 17, 2004); see also Bob Sherwood, Legal Reconstruction: Investors Want
Reassurance Over Iraq's Framework of Commercial Law, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 3,
2003, at Law & Business 14, available at LEXIS, News Library, Fintme File.
6 See infra Part II.A for a discussion about sulh. For the sake of simplicity, from this
point forward, this Note will incorporate all references to non-Iraqis (all foreign military,
governmental workers, and non-governmental workers) into the term "Americans." The
author recognizes that there are numerous foreigners in Iraq, and that this Note may not
apply to all non-Iraqi cultures.
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Afghanistan and other predominantly Muslim countries where the United
States (U.S.) military might operate.
Part I discusses the need for ADR in Iraq, and provides a summary of the
government in Iraq, including a focus on the emerging Iraqi legal system.
Iraq's existing legal system, coupled with new Western principles, will form
a complex system based on Islamic law, Muslim culture, civil law, common
law, and a new Iraqi constitution. Familiarity with this legal system clarifies
the role ADR can play to help provide efficient outcomes in a traditional
manner as Iraq revamps its legal system. Part H examines the role of dispute
resolution in Islam, including some traditional forms of dispute resolution.
Part III provides a theoretical discussion of American and Muslim cultural
norms from individualist, low-context and collectivist, high-context
perspectives, and how these cultural norms affect mediation. Part IV
proposes the role that mediation should play in Iraq's future, and examines
other cross-cultural mediations for lessons.
I. WHAT ROLE WILL ADR PLAY IN IRAQ?
A. Need for ADR in Iraq
In a complex and diverse country like Iraq, with a presence of thousands
of foreign troops and, until recently, governed by an international
organization, there are wide-ranging numbers and types of disputes, ranging
from local disagreements to international policy differences. In southern Iraq,
British military officers have found themselves mediating tribal feuds.7 U.S.
soldiers have been stationed at gasoline stations to manage disputes resulting
from fuel shortages.8 Military attorneys (Judge Advocate Generals or JAGs,
for short) have handled many disputes, such as negotiating the return of
7 Alex Berenson, British Mediate Hatfields and McCoys, Iraqi-Style, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2003, at A18. British soldiers had to intervene when rival tribes in Basra began
killing one another. Id. The mediation methods the British used are similar to the methods
proposed in this Note.
8 See Mitch Potter, Delays Fuel Rage at Iraqi Pumps, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 6, 2003,
at Al; Carol J. Williams & Samir Zedan, Drivers Become Gas Sellers as Lines Grow at
Pumps in Iraq: A Sudden Shortage Spurs Black Marketeers to Action. They Can Charge
20 Times as Much for Quick Roadside Service, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A3.
Coalition soldiers have to keep Iraqis from getting out of hand at gasoline stations where
the wait to use a pump is about six hours. Id. Drivers have become so outraged at the long
waits that they have burned tires and started shouting at coalition soldiers. Id.
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seized property and negotiating contracts. 9 Sunni, Shi'ite, and Kurdish
organizations are in dispute over the type of government that will be formed
in Iraq, what role Islam will play in that government, and what kind of legal
structures will guarantee citizens' rights. 10 Iraqi lawyers, judges, citizens, and
victims and relatives of victims of the Ba'ath Party's punishment and torture
are in dispute as to how to handle the prosecution and punishment of Saddam
Hussein and his followers." The new Legal Department of the Ministry of
Justice must resolve disputes on international claims against Iraq, which total
$326 billion. 12
9 See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., & Paula B. McCarron, Negotiation in the Trenches: In
War Zones, Military Attorneys Use Negotiation to Resolve a Wide Variety of Disputes, 10
DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2003, at 4-5. Air Force JAG officers at Baghdad International
Airport had to negotiate with Iraqi business owner after soldiers seized one of his
bulldozers. Id. The JAG officers also had to negotiate contracts for supplying
construction supplies. Id.
10 Anne Barnard, New Factions Struggle for a Say in Politics, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
4, 2004, at A12; Bartle Breese Bull, Will the Kurds go Home?, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2004,
at A23; Dexter Filkins, Kurds Threaten to Walk Away From Iraqi State, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2004, at Al; Steven R. Weisman, Holding Iraq Together, By Tending to Its Parts,
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2004, at D5; Steven R. Weisman, The Shape of a Future Iraq: U.S.
Entangled in Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at A10. The Kurds and Sunni minorities
are seeking guarantees of representation in the new Iraqi government. Id. There is also a
dispute over religion-the Shi'a majority wants Islam and Islamic law as the official
religion and law of Iraq. Id.
I1 Evan Osnos, Iraq's Bind: Revenge or Justice?: Tribunals Could Heal or Open
Wounds, Cm. TRIB., Dec. 22, 2003, at Al. After the transfer of sovereign power to Iraq
on June 28, 2004, the new Iraqi government was quick to move forward with charging
Saddam Hussein and his top aides with various crimes. See Ian Fisher & John F. Burns,
Court Hands Legal Custody of Saddam Hussein to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at
A10; John F. Burns, Defiant Hussein Rebukes Iraqi Court for Trying Him, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2004, at Al.
12 Bloomberg News, Iraq's $326 Billion Debt, War Claims May Complicate
Rebuilding (May 8, 2003), available at
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=nifea&&sid=ajN.4f0LBBo8 (last visited
Sept. 21, 2004). Among other nations, Iraq owes sovereign debt to Russia ($9 billion),
France ($1.8 billion), Saudi Arabia ($25 billion), and Germany ($4.3 billion), as well as
claims relating to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait ($199 billion). Id. The United States has
led efforts to reduce Iraq's foreign debt, and in December 2003, President Bush sent
James A. Baker, Ell to numerous countries to negotiate debt reduction. See Elisabeth
Bumiller, Baker Briefs Bush on Trip on Reducing Iraq's Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
2003, at A8; Craig S. Smith, France and Germany Join U.S. in Effort to Reduce Iraq's
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2003, at Al; Steven R. Weisman, Baker to Press Arab Lands
to Forgive Huge Iraqi Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2004, at A11. Despite the United States'
diplomatic efforts, discussions with several of the nations, including France, continue.
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These wide varieties of disputes demonstrate the need for both interim
and permanent ADR methods in Iraq. Interim ADR is needed to help the
Iraqis deal with coalition and international organizations and each other.
ADR has proven useful thus far as the Iraqis develop their constitution, draft
laws, and reform their judiciary. 13 ADR can continue to serve as a useful
mechanism to help resolve conflict, both during the formation of a "new"
Iraq, and after the establishment of the permanent government.
Dispute resolution in Iraq is vital interpersonally, locally, nationally,
internationally, and across ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. 14
Because Iraq is approximately 97% Muslim, 15 an awareness of Islamic law
and culture is important to understanding the important role dispute
resolution traditionally plays in Iraq and the Middle East. 16 Awareness of
American ADR (the predominant country helping to rebuild Iraq) will help
Americans develop approaches to bridge cultural and religious gaps.17 To
first comprehend the effective role that ADR can fill in Iraq, it is necessary to
have an understanding of the current state of the government and legal
structures in Iraq.18
Richard W. Stevenson & David E. Sanger, Bush Doesn't See NATO Sending in Troops
for Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at Al; see, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, Sovereign
Bankruptcy: In Re Germany (1953), in Re Iraq (2004), 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 302 (2004).
13 In February 2004, President Bush asked the United Nations to send a delegation
to Iraq to help the various Iraqi factions reach an agreement on the transfer of power to
Iraq. Steven R. Weisman, Bush Presses U.N. to Mediate Iraqi Clash on Rule, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2004, at Al. The U.N. sent Lakhdar Brahimi to help the Iraqis and the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) develop a plan for the transition of power to Iraq.
The task proved challenging for Mr. Brahimi, but the end goal-a sovereign Iraq-seems
to validate the use of a third party to mediate conflict in Iraq. See Dexter Filkins, A Worn
Road for U.N. Aide, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2004, at Al; Warren Hoge, U.N. 's Envoy for
Iraq Takes the Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004, at A12. But see William Safire,
Brahimi's Two Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at A19. See generally Dexter
Filkins & Steven R. Weisman, After a Flurry of Negotiations, a Leading Candidate
Emerges for the Presidency of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2004, at A8.
14 There are substantial numbers and varieties of disputes in Iraq. ADR processes
are imperative in Iraq for efficient settlement of claims between Iraqis, between Iraqis
and coalition occupation forces, and between Iraq and the many nations it is indebted to,
especially considering the transition and rebuilding process that Iraq is enduring.
15 See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook: Iraq, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
16 See discussion infra Part III.
17 See id.
18 The transitional nature of Iraq, especially the revitalization of the Iraqi courts,
makes ADR an effective tool to resolve disputes. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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B. Current State of the Legal System in Iraq
1. The United Nations and the Coalition Provisional Authority
As coalition forces advanced on Baghdad in April 2003, the U.S.
announced plans for reconstruction in Iraq. 19 Initially, the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance led reconstruction efforts. 20 In
May 2003, responsibility for reconstruction shifted to an interim authority led
by the U.S.21 On May 22, 2003, the United Nations (U.N.) reaffirmed its
previous resolutions concerning Iraq and recognized the "specific authorities,
responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these
states [the U.S.-led coalition] as occupying powers under unified
command."'22 The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) governed Iraq until
June 28, 2004.23
19 See Office of the Press Secretary, Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses Iraq
Reconstruction (Apr. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030404-12.html (last visited Feb.
27, 2005). Dr. Rice announced the role of the United States, coalition partners, and the
United Nations in the reconstruction of Iraq. Id. She also explained the organization of
the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), its mission, and its
authority. Id.
20 Id. Retired General Jay Garner initially led the ORHA. Id.
21 See Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, I, Statement from Baghdad, Iraq (May 15,
2003), available at http:llwww.defenselink.milltranscripts/2003/tr20030515-0186.html
(last visited Sept. 20, 2004). Ambassador Bremer assumed leadership of the CPA because
of his diplomatic and counterterrorism credentials. James Dao, At the Helm in Shattered
Iraq: Lewis Paul Bremer III, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at A16. It is not entirely clear
why Ambassador Bremer replaced General Garner in Iraq, but some believe General
Garner's invisibility to Iraqis, clashes with top military commanders in Iraq, and inability
to gain control over the chaos in Iraq are to blame. See Patrick E. Tyler & Edmund L.
Andrews, U.S. Overhauls Administration to Govern Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2003, at
Al; see also Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1, Doc. CPA/REG/16
May 2003/01 (describing the role of the Coalitional Provisional Authority), at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Provisio
nalAuthority_.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
22 S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1483
(2003); Fredric L. Kirgis, Security Council Resolution 1483 on the Rebuilding of Iraq,
ASIL Insights: The American Society of International Law (May 2003), available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh107.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2004). International
legal scholars understand the reference to "applicable international law" to refer to The
Hague Regulations of 1907 and Geneva Conventions of 1949 that confers obligations on
an occupying power and limits the changes the occupying power can make to a nation's
laws. See Jordan J. Paust, The U.S. as Occupying Power Over Portions of Iraq and
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Although the CPA was led by the U.S. and the United Kingdom (U.K.),
some 63 different nations were part of the rebuilding effort.24 On July 13,
2003, CPA Administrator, L. Paul Bremer, III, appointed the Iraqi Governing
Council-an important step towards Iraqi self-government.25 The U.N.
welcomed the establishment of the Governing Council on August 14, 2003,
and established the U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq in order to carry out the
duties and responsibilities of the U.N. as defined in U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1483 and the July 15, 2003, report of the Secretary-General. 26
The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1511 on October 15, 2003,
outlining the roles of the U.N., the CPA, and the Iraqi Governing Council,
and calling for the Iraqi Governing Council to submit a timeline for drafting
a constitution. 27 On November 15, 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council agreed
to a timeline for restoring Iraqi self-government, creating a constitution, and
Relevant Responsibilities Under the Laws of War, ASIL Insights: The American Society
of International Law (April 2003), available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh102.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
23 The CPA was a temporary governing body designated by the United Nations as
the lawful government of Iraq until Iraq was politically and socially stable enough to
resume its self-government. Coalition Provisional Authority, Overview, at
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/bremerbio.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004); S.C. Res. 1511,
U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4844th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (2003).
24 See Coalition Provisional Authority, Countries Eligible to Compete for Contracts
Funded with U.S. Appropriated Funds for Iraq Reconstruction, at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/pressreleases/20031211_CoalitionCountry-List.pdf (last visited Sept. 20,
2004).
25 See Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraqi Governing Council, at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/government/goveming-council.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2004); Coalition
Provisional Authority Regulation Number 6, Doc. CPA/REG/13 July 2003/06, at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030713_CPAREG6_GovemingCouncil-of
_Iraq_.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2004). See also Patrick E. Tyler, Leadership; Iraqi
Factions Agree on Members of Governing Council, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, at A10.
26 See S.C. Res. 1500, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4804th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1500
(2003); Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 24 of Security Council
Resolution 1483, U.N. Doc. S/2003/715 (2003), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep03.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2004); Press Release,
U.N. Security Council, Security Council Establishes U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq,
Welcomes Creation of Governing Council as 'Important Step' (Sept. 20, 2003), available
at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7843.doc.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
27 See S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 23; United Nations News Centre, Security Council
Outlines Roles in Bringing Peace, Stability to Iraq (Oct. 16, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewslD=8579&Cr=iraq&Crl= (last visited
Sept. 21, 2004). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 was a major step in clarifying
and guaranteeing a U.N. role in the rebuilding of Iraq. Id.
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holding national elections.28 The Iraqi Governing Council signed the interim
constitution on March 8, 2004.29
A critical action came on June 8, 2004, when the U.N. Security Council
approved Resolution 1546, a plan for the transfer of full sovereignty to Iraq,
by a vote of 15-0.30 On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred full sovereignty
to the interim Iraqi government. 31 Transfer of sovereign power to Iraq
marked the end of the American occupation of Iraq. Now, America's most
important role in Iraq is to provide security and assist the Interim
Government in electing the Transitional Government in January 2005 that
will lead to a permanent democracy.
2. The Iraqi Interim Government
The Iraqi Interim Government's primary responsibility is to oversee
Iraq's affairs, particularly preparing for national elections to be held by
January 31, 2005.32 The Interim Government is led by a president, two
deputy presidents, and a prime minister who leads the Council of Ministers.33
28 The proposed timeline called for the creation of a transitional administrative law
by February 28, 2004, the election of delegates to a Iraqi Transitional National Assembly
by May 31, 2004, the Iraqi Transitional National Assembly assuming full power by June
30, 2004 (to include the dissolution of the CPA and Iraqi Governing Council), the
election of a constitutional convention by March 15, 2005, and national elections for a
new Iraqi government by December 31, 2005 (coinciding with the dissolution of the
Transitional National Assembly). See The November 15 Agreement: Timeline to a
Sovereign, Democratic and Secure Iraq, at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/government/AgreementNov 15.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).
29 Dexter Filkins, Iraq Council, With Reluctant Shiites, Signs Charter, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2004, at Al.
30 Warren Hoge, Security Council Backs Resolution on Iraq Turnover, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2004, at Al. See S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4987th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1546 (2004). Resolution 1546 calls for elections for a national assembly to be held
by January 31, 2005. Id. The assembly will then form a transitional government, which
will draft a permanent constitution leading to direct elections for a permanent government
by December 31, 2005. Id. Resolution 1546 is -also significant in that it addresses the
relationship between Iraq and the American-led MNF. Id.
31 Dexter Filkins, U.S. Transfers Power to Iraq 2 Days Early, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2004, at Al.
32 See Iraqi Interim Government Announcement Ceremony Press Packet 2, available
at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/press-packet.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).
33 Id. The President of the Iraqi Interim Government is Sheik Ghazi a-Yawwer, and
the two Deputy Presidents are Dr. Ebrahim Jaafari al-Eshaiker and Dr. Rowsch Shaways.
See Press Release, Coalition Provisional Authority, Listing of the Iraqi Interim
Government, at
494
[Vol. 20:2 2005]
ADR IN THE NEW IRAQ
The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) is the law that the Interim
Government must follow.34 The Interim Government also includes an
Interim National Council and a Judicial Authority.35 The Judicial Authority
is independent of the executive branch of the Interim Government and
includes a Federal Supreme Court, a Court of Cassation,36 courts of appeal,
and the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. 37 There is also a Higher Juridical
Council that supervises the federal judiciary and administers its budget.38
The appointment of an Interim Government and the eventual election of
a Transitional Government are important steps in Iraq's legal system as
Iraq's new body of constitutional and statutory law will emerge over the next
few years from this process. While the government of Iraq is formed, the
Ministry of Justice is also restructuring and is slowly gaining the ability to
oversee litigation and prosecutions in Iraq.
3. The Ministry of Justice
Before the war in Iraq began, the Ministry of Justice oversaw three
different court systems: civil courts, courts of personal status (governing
Muslim marriage, family, and inheritance law), and criminal courts. 39 Iraq's
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/pressreleases/20040602-govemment-list.html (last visited
Sept. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Listing]. The Prime Minister of the Iraqi Interim Government
is Dr. Ayad Allawi. Id.
34 See Listing, supra note 33, at 2. The TAL provides a bill of rights for the Iraqi
people and a roadmap to the permanent Iraqi constitution. Id. The TAL Annex describes
the powers of the Interim Government and contains laws that pertain specifically to the
Interim Government, many of which are limiting. Id. at 4. See Coalition Provisional
Authority, Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, at
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2004); Coalition
Provisional Authority, Annex to the Law for the Administration of Iraq in Transitional
Period), at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TALAnnex.html (last visited Sept. 21,
2004).
35 See Iraqi Interim Government Announcement Ceremony Press Packet 2, supra
note 32, at 3.
36 The Court of Cassation is the highest judicial body in Iraq. It sits in Baghdad and
its jurisdiction covers all of Iraq. Sabah Al Mukhtar, The Rule of Law in Iraq: Does it
Exist?, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 76 (Eugene Cotran & Mai Yamani eds., 2000).
37 See Iraqi Interim Government Announcement Ceremony Press Packet 2, supra
note 32, at 4.
38 Id.
39 Marcia Coyle, Toward an Iraqi Legal System; A U.S.-Sponsored Plan in the
Works, NAT'L L.J. (Apr. 25, 2003). Most sources tend to agree that the civil law and civil
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Ministry of Justice was part of a "parallel" system of justice where some
individual ministries had separate courts, rules, and laws for different
factions of the government, such as revolutionary courts, Ba'ath Party courts,
intelligence service courts, and military courts. 40 Ba'ath Party influence on
the court system was significant, and the judiciary lacked independence. 41
Perhaps the strongest image of the lack of an independent judiciary was a
poster hanging outside the Ministry of Justice depicting Saddam Hussein
holding the scales of justice.42 However, the Ministry of Justice was not as
corrupt as other ministries or courts, because the Ministry of Justice focused
on civil litigation, whereas Saddam Hussein repressed Iraqis through the
other court systems mentioned above.43
With Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party out of power, the CPA
moved quickly to establish an independent judicial system. The major efforts
in reforming the Ministry of Justice and the Iraqi legal system include re-
establishing the 1969 Iraqi Penal Code, but suspending inhumane and
oppressive crimes;44 instituting the Central Criminal Court of Iraq;45
court system did not operate in contravention of international law or human rights, and
that there is little need to overhaul the existing law. Id.
40 See Eric Slater & Laura King, Court Back in Session in Baghdad: U.S. Trumpets
the Resumption of Legal Hearings Being Conducted by Iraqis, L.A. TIMEs, May 9, 2003,
at Al. Most people would assume that the Ministry of Justice was a tool of oppression
under Saddam Hussein. Id. Actually, Iraqis prosecuted for political crimes or "security
offenses" were channeled into the parallel court systems. Id.
41 See Kelly Lucas, Rebuilding in Iraq Turns to Judiciary, 14 THE INDIANA
LAWYER; Dec. 3-16, at 1. U.S. Army JAG officers found that cleaning Ba'ath 'party
corruption from the court system was their toughest task. Id.; Peter Slevin, U.S. Starts
Remake of Iraqi Judicial System; Political Pressure, Graft Were Common During
Hussein's Rule, WASH. POST, May 9, 2003, at A18 (providing an excellent overview of
the corrupt and decrepit state of the Iraqi legal system at the end of the American
liberation of Iraq); Alex Wade, Don't Cry for Me Just Yet-I May Be Here Some Time,
TIMES (London), May 27, 2003, at Law 5 (noting that one of Ambassador Bremer's
biggest initial tasks was to address the legal system, including the independence of
judges).
42 Saddam's Image and Presence is Omnipresent in Iraq (NPR radio broadcast, Feb.
5, 2003).
143 See discussion supra note 40; Betsy Pisik, Top Members of Saddam's Regime
Face Trial in Iraq: Chamber to Feature Native Judges, WASH. TIMES, May 9, 2003, at
Al.
44 See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 7, Doc. CPA/ORD/9 June 2003/7
(affirming the 1969 Iraqi Penal Code with exceptions: capital punishment was suspended
and torture and cruel and degrading treatment were prohibited), at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030610 CPAORD_7_PenalCode.pdf (last
visited Sept. 21, 2004); Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 31, CPA/ORD/10 Sep
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founding the Judicial Review Committee;46 launching the Legal Department
of the Ministry of Justice; 47 and reconvening of the Council of Judges.48 The
Ministry of Justice also has oversight of notaries public, deeds and records,
and the prison system.49 The Ministry of Justice is a complex organization,
but the history and formation of the Iraqi legal system is even more complex.
A discussion of the traditional Iraqi legal system provides valuable insight to
the current state of legal affairs in Iraq, what the future legal system might
look like, and underscores the effective role ADR can play in resolving
disputes in Iraq.
C. The Iraqi Legal System
1. History
The Iraqi legal system is a mixed system based on both Sunni and Shi'a
schools of law, civil law, and common law.50 This mixed system of law is
2003/31 (modifying various provisions of the penal code and criminal proceedings law),
at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/2003092 I_CPAORD3 1.pdf (last visited Sept.
21, 2004); Lucas, supra note 41, at 1.
45 See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 13 (Revised) (Amended), Doc.
CPA/ORD/X 2004/13 (establishing the existence of and procedure for the Central
Criminal Court of Iraq), at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040422_CPAORD_13_Revised_Amended.pd
f (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).
46 See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 15, Doc. CPA/ORD/23 June
2003/15 (establishing the Judicial Review Committee to "investigate and gather
information on the suitability of [jludges and [p]rosecutors to hold office"), at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030623_CPAORD_15Establishment_ofthe
-JudicialReveiw_Committee.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).
47 See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 32, Doc. CPA/ORD/4 September
2003/32 (assigning responsibly "for management of international litigation, claims and
arbitrations involving the Government of Iraq and its governmental agencies,
instrumentalities and companies"), at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030909_CPAORD32.pdf (last visited Sept.
21,2004).
48 See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 35, Doc. CPAIORD/13 SEP
2003/35 (re-establishing "the Council of Judges... which is charged with the
supervision of the judicial and prosecutorial systems of Iraq"), at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030921_CPAORD35.pdf (last visited Aug.
14, 2004). The Council will function independently of the Ministry of Justice. Id.
49 See Coalitional Provisional Authority Ministry of Justice Facts-in-Brief, at
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/factsheets/MoJ_facts-in-brief.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
50 S.H. Amin, The Legal System of Iraq, in 5 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA
5.110.18 (Kenneth R. Redden ed., 1990) [hereinafter Amin, CYCLOPEDIA]. This source
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unique for two reasons: Shi'a Muslims dominate Iraq, whereas Sunni
Muslims dominate other Arab nations5t and there is a strong influence of both
civil law (owing to Ottoman rule from the 1500s until the First World War)
and common law (owing to the British Mandate from 1915 until 1932).52
Iraq's history from 1915 until the present day has been instrumental in
shaping Iraq's current legal system. From 1921 until the revolution of 1958,
Iraq was a monarchy. 53 During this time, Ottoman influence dominated civil
law and procedure, and British influence dominated penal codes and criminal
procedure. 54 The Iraqi National Assembly enacted many laws during the
monarchy that exist today, most notably the 1951 Civil Code.55 The July 14
Revolution in 1958 ended the monarchy and established a republic in Iraq.56
The period from 1958 until 1968 saw the enactment and amendment of
various constitutions.57 In July 1968, the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party came to
power through yet another revolution. 58 Legal reform that began with the
1968 revolution was based on subordinating the private rights of individual
citizens to the socialistic priorities of the State.59 Included in this "reform"
provides a compact overview of the Iraqi legal system as it existed in 1990. For an in-
depth analysis of the Iraqi legal system, see S.H. AMIN, LEGAL SYSTEM OF IRAQ (1989).
This text is over 600 pages in length, and covers all aspects of Iraqi law.
51 Amin, CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 50, at 5.110.18.
52 See id. at 5.110.13-14. For an excellent summary of Iraqi history, a brief
discussion of the rule of law in Iraq, and an overview of the effects of the 1991 Persian
Gulf War on Iraq, see Mukhtar, supra note 36, at 71-80.
53 Mukhtar, supra note 36, at 73, 75; World War I and the British Mandate, in
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FEDERAL RESEARCH DIvISION, IRAQ-A COUNTRY STUDY (Helen
Chapin Metz ed., 1988), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/iqtoc.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2004).
54 See Amin, CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 50, at 5.110.15-16.
55 Id. at 5.110.16. The 1951 Civil Code was apparently well written as evidenced by
its survival through numerous changes in Iraq. See id.5 6 Republican Iraq, in LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FEDERAL RESEARCH DIvISION,
IRAQ-A COUNTRY STuDY (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1988), available at
http:/Icweb2.loc.gov/frdlcs/iqtoc.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). A disgruntled group
of military officers led soldiers into Baghdad and proclaimed a republic and the end of
the monarchy. Id. Many members of the royal family were executed. Id.; S.H. AMIN,
MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS 166 (1985). Dr. Amin's work provides an extensive
analysis of the Iraqi legal system (although it is dated 1985). Little in terms of the
structure of the legal system is expected to change with the new Iraqi government, so Dr.
Amin's work provides insight into how the new legal system may be structured.
57 AMIN, supra.note 56, at 223.
58 Id. at 174.
59 Id. at 174-78.
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was the passage of the 1969 Penal Code that contained numerous oppressive
and inhumane laws.6°
As we now know, since 1968 (and especially during Saddam Hussein's
rule from 1979 until 2003), the Ba'ath Party bypassed established laws and
used a parallel "judicial" system to oppress those who would challenge or
threaten the government.61 Saddam Hussein is no longer in power, and the
legal system is reforming in Iraq, but one can anticipate that the basic sources
of Iraqi law will not change.
2. Sources of Iraqi Law
The "[p]rimary sources of Iraqi law, in order of significance, can be
described as follows: (1) Islamic law; (2) constitutional law; (3) legislation
and statutory provisions." 62 Islamic law, also known as "Shari'a," "path," or
the "right path," is a complicated law in itself, among which there are several
different schools of law.63 As mentioned, Iraq is 60-65% Shi'a.64 The Shi'a
60 See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
61 See Coyle, supra note 39; see also Anthony McDermott, Intervention,
Sovereignty and Iraq: Absorbing and Deflecting the Blows, in OIL AND WATER:
COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF 233-35 (Bjom Moiler ed., 2001)
(discussing the authoritarian rule in Iraq by the Ba'ath Party and the cult of personality of
Saddam Hussein); Robert G. Rabil, The Making of Saddam 's Executioners: A Manual of
Oppression by Procedures, 7 MIDDLE EAST R. INT'L AFF. 38 (March 2003), available at
http://meria.idc.ac.il/joumal/2003/issuel/rabil.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2004) (providing
an in-depth analysis of how Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party came to power and
examines how the Ba'ath Party used numerous procedures of oppression to rule Iraq
through intimidation and fear).
62 See AMIN, supra note 56, at 222.
63 The Sunni sect of Islam includes four schools of law: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and
Hanbali, each of which relies on different sources of law to varying degrees (e.g., the
Koran, the prevailing sunna (customary law, which can be based on many different local
and tribal customs), reason, and analogy). Majid Khadduri, Nature and Sources of
Islamic Law, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 3 (1953), reprinted in ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 87, 94-104 (Ian Edge ed., 1996). This brief article provides an excellent and
brief overview of the basics of Islamic law. The rest of the book has extensive analysis of
the development of the Sunni and Shi'a schools of law. Khadduri is also noteworthy for
his translation into English of Shaybani's siyar. MAID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF
NATIONS: SHAYBANI'S SIYAR (Majid Khadduri trans., 1966). Shaybani was a jurist who
compiled the siyar, literally meaning the conduct of the ruler, which is a specialized set
of traditions and commentary on the conduct of war and affairs of state by the early
Muslims. Id. at 22-26, 38-41; see WILLIAM M. BALLANTYNE, A Short Introduction to the
Shari'a, in ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES ON ARAB LAWS 33-42 (2000); Christopher Melchert,
Islamic Law, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 901 (1998) (discussing how early Muslims
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Muslims believe that the imamate (caliphate) must not only be from the tribe
of Quraysh, but must also be a descendant of Ali, the son-in-law of
Mohammed.65 Shi'ites follow three basic schools of law: Zaydis, "Twelvers"
(which the majority of Shi'ites follow), and "Seveners. ''66 The differences
between Shi'ite and Sunni law are matters of detail (aside from the doctrine
of the imamate); the Shi'ite concept of law is more authoritarian and
detached from social reality than that of the Sunnis.67 In modem Iraq, Islamic
law fills in any gap in secular civil law, but even the Iraqi Civil Code of 1951
is roughly based on the Ottoman Civil Code (Majallat), which was a codified
version of traditional Islamic law. 68 In short, Islamic law is the dominant
source of substantive private law in Iraq.69 Following the July 14 Revolution
in 1958, various constitutions were enacted in Iraq. The most recent, the
Constitution of 1968, describes the Iraqi state, the fundamental foundations
of the society, civil rights and duties, and the distribution of authority within
the government. 70 Theoretically, Islamic law was the major source of law in
Iraq, but, in reality, secular legislation passed by the National Assembly and
approved by the Revolutionary Command (in the name of the people) was
the main source of law in Iraq.71
derived the law from the Qur'an, hadith, and other indications of God's will). Melchert
also discusses some criticisms of the traditional history of Islamic law and the effect of
following Islamic law in everyday life. Melchert, supra, at 908-09; C.G. WEERAmANTRY,
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 46-58 (1998). Weeramantry's
work provides an excellent analysis of Islamic law, from the origins of Islamic law, to
basic Islamic legal ideas, to a discussion of Islamic international law. See also David A.
Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Separate
Expressions of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 819, 823-31 (1993) (providing a good
overview of Islamic law, including a glossary of terms). More importantly, and outside
the scope of this article, Westbrook examines Islam's view on international public law,
arguing that Islam has not articulated an international law, and examines the possibilities
for the formulation of an Islamic international law. Id.
64 See CIA, The World Factbook: Iraq, supra note 15.
65 See Khadduri, Nature and Sources of Islamic Law, supra note 63 at 104-07. The
caliph is "[tihe person acting in Muhammad's place after his death, i.e., the leader of
Islam (sunni)." Caliph, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ORIENT, available at
http://www.lexicorient.com/e.o/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
66 Khadduri, Nature and Sources of lslamic Law, supra note 63, at 105.
67 Id. at 106-07.
68 AMIN, supra note 56, at 221-22; see Mukhtar, supra note 36, at 75.
69 AMIN, supra note 56, at 221-22.
70 Id. at 223-24.
71 Id. at 224.
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Transitional law currently rules Iraq and the country is moving towards
adopting a new constitution, but the importance of that constitutional law in
Iraq will continue. The new constitution will likely define the functions of
the Iraqi State, the fundamental foundations of the government, and the civil
rights of the people. The Iraqi Governing Council and the CPA drafted and
approved an interim constitution that, similar to the U.S. Constitution,
contains many guarantees of fundamental liberties.72 However, the
Transitional Administrative Law is just that-transitional. The temporary and
uncertain nature of the law in Iraq makes ADR an important tool to provide
Iraqis with a reliable and familiar method for resolving disputes with
Americans and other foreigners.
II. DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY
A. The Concept of Sulh
There is a strong tradition in Islamic culture that encourages the peaceful
resolution of disputes between Muslims. 73 The Qur'an gives Muslims many
explicit instructions on how to resolve their disputes, one being
if two groups of believers fought with each other, you shall reconcile them.
If one group aggresses against the other, you shall fight the aggressing
group until they submit to God's command. Once they submit, you shall
reconcile the two groups equitably. You shall maintain justice; God loves
those who are just.74
72 Dexter Filkins, Iraqis Receive U.S. Approval of Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2004, at Al; Filkins, supra note 29. The constitution guarantees broad freedoms for
individuals, including freedom of religion (although Islam is the State religion, and no
law may undermine Islam), and the rights of free speech, assembly, and press. Id. The
constitution also provides for an independent judiciary, civilian control of the military,
and a system of checks and balances on all branches of the government. Id.
73 See Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Conflict Resolution in an Islamic Context: Some
Conceptual Questions, reprinted in PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ISLAM 128
(Abdul Aziz Said et al. eds., 2001) ("[Negotiation, mediation, and arbitration] have been
applied to settle interpersonal, community, and inter-religious disputes in Islamic
societies for hundreds of years.").
74 Qur'an 49:9 in The Holy Qur'an. This reference to the Qur'an comes from Walid
Iqbal's excellent article on ADR and Islam. Walid Iqbal, Dialogue and the Practice of
Law and Spiritual Values: Courts Lawyering, and ADR: Glimpses Into the Islamic
Tradition, 28 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1035 (2001).
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This quotation foreshadows, the importance of sulh (compromise,
settlement, or agreement. between parties to a dispute) in Islam. 75 "[T]he
purpose Of'sulh is to end conflict and hostility among believers so that they
may conduct their relationships in peace and amity. ' 7 6 Sulh is a legally
binding form of a contract.77 The purpose of sulh appears consistent with the
Western concept of ADR, but the process that leads to sulh is usually
different -between the two systems. Under Islamic law, ADR and the court
systems are essentially mixed, but, historically, the court systems have relied
on the concept of sulh to dispense justice more efficiently than court-ordered
mediation in Western systems.78
B. The Qadi
In the Islamic legal tradition, the qadi (Islamic judge) often helped
disputants reach sulh.7 9 The Ottoman legal system demonstrated the proper
75 See Iqbal, supra note 74, at 1035; Abu-Nimer, supra note 73, at 136 ("[I]n Arab
society the process of 'Sulh'... is an essential part of reaching an agreement."); George
E. Irani & Nathan C. Funk, Rituals'of Reconciliation: Arab-Islamic Perspectives, in
PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ISLAM: PRECEPT AND PRACTICE .182 (Abdul Aziz
Said et al. eds., 2001) ("One of the most important -unofficial responses to conflict in
Middle Eastern societies is sulh ... .
76 Iqbal, supra note 74, at 1035 (quoting M. Khadduri, Sulh, in 9 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM, NEW EDITION 845 (Clifford Edmond Bosworth et al. eds.,
1997)).
77 id.
78 See id. at 1035-36. Iqbal does not explicitly state why Islamic systems are more
efficient than Western ones, but one can infer that the ability of the qadi to apply
religious leverage to the parties is part of the reason. Id. at 1037-39, 1040-42.
79 
"See Iqbal, supra note 74, at 1036-39. One definition of the qadi is:
Judge in Islam, whose responsibility is restricted to issues connected to
religion. A qadi must be a man educated in Islamic science, and his performance
must be totally congruent with Sharia without using his own interpretation. In a trial
in front of a qadi, it is the plaintiff who is responsible to bring evidence against the
defendant in order to have him or her convicted. There are no appeals to the
judgements [sic] of a qadi. A qadi must not receive gifts from participants in a trial
and he must be careful in engaging himself in trade. Despite the rules for the office,
Muslim history is full of complaints about qadis. Often it has been a problem, that
qadis have been managers of waqfs, religious endowments. The origin of the
institution of qadi, is the old Arab arbitrator, the hakam, but qualities from officials
in areas conquered by Arabs have been added to the structure.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ORIENT, available at http:llwww.lexicorient.comle.o/ (last visited
Sept. 20, 2004).
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role of the qadi under Islamic law. 80 In the Ottoman system, the qadi was
independent from the government, although the imperial authority appointed
and removed qadis, and set limits on their jurisdiction. The qadi applied both
substantive and procedural law to the cases before him, could consider and
admit evidence, and had the cooperation of the police to enforce decisions.8 1
Qadis preferred reconciliation between the. parties instead of enforcement of
a judgment. 82 Many cases were settled through mediation.83 Through
mediation, the parties reached sulh on "mutually acceptable terms and
surrendered all rights to further claim on the matter." 84
One final item to consider is the preference for simplicity and informality
in the qadi courts.85 The qadi courts focused on determining the truth and
administering justice through minimal procedural intricacies. 86 Lawyers
(wakils) were seldom appointed or used in court.87 There was a preference
for self-representation, supplemented, when necessary, with procedural and
substantive guidance from the qadi.88 The confrontation of the defendant by
the plaintiff, the presence of reliable witnesses, and the use of oaths were
indispensable to the process.89 In sum, the qadi courts were simple, personal,
and unbiased.
C. Sulh and Qadis in Modem Saudi Arabia
Under the regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a secular society.90 The
future Iraqi government is likely to retain its secular nature, although some
80 See Iqbal, supra note 74, at 1036-39.
81 See id. at 1035-36 (referring to Ronald C. Jennings, Kadi, Court, and Legal
Procedure in 17th Century Ottoman Kayseri, 48 STUDIA ISLAMICA 133 (R. Brunschvig &
J. Schacht eds., 1978); Ronald C. Jennings, Limitations of the Judicial Powers of the
Kadi in 17th Century Ottoman Kayseri, 50 STUDIA ISLAMICA 151 (R. Brunschvig & J.
Schacht eds., 1979)).
82 Id. at 1037.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See id. at 1040-42.
86 See id. at 1038.
87 Id.
88 ld. at 1038.
89 See id. at 1038-39.
90 See, e.g., Amin, LEGAL SYSTEM OF IRAQ, supra note 50, at 77, 100-02.
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clerics in Iraq have urged an Islamic state. 91 However, the legal system in
Saudi Arabia, which adheres to the traditional Islamic-state model, may
provide a model for ADR in the new Iraqi government. The "great majority"
or "99%" of all civil cases in Saudi Islamic courts end in reconciliation,
demonstrating the Saudi adherence to the maxim "sulh is best."'92 One reason
why so many cases result in compromise in Saudi Arabia is the informal
approach to trial. There is an opposition to the use of professional lawyers;
instead, the qadi protects the parties from unfair practices and helps guide
them through the adjudicatory process.93
There are some disadvantages to the reliance on a qadi in the Saudi
system. An incompetent qadi may abuse the system, or an unjust result may
occur that might not have occurred under customary law.94 Sulh also keeps
qadis from applying their intellect to actual legal problems and principles,
preventing them from exercising independent and interpretive judgment in
complex cases, all of which may lead to an absence of solid substantive and
procedural rules to address modem problems. 95
D. Modern ADR Mechanisms in Muslim Culture
As highlighted above, mediation has historically been the primary source
of dispute resolution in the Muslim world. Muslim culture places a high
value on honor and self-respect, and mediation provides a more dignified
91 E.g., Iraqi Cleric Wants an Islamic State, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 11, 2003.
Many Shi'ite clerics, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, are seeking an increased role for Islamic
law in the new Iraqi state. Id. See also discussion supra note 72 and infra notes 137 &
159.
92 iqbal, supra note 74, at 1040 (quoting Frank E. Vogel, IsLAMIc LAW AND LEGAL
SYSTEM: STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA 154 (2000)).
93 Id. at 1041. In Saudi Arabia, the qadis
are not mere adjudicators; they possess great skills as mediators and conciliators.
For example, if a kadi believes that a settlement or compromise would yield a just
outcome, he will aim-sometimes even forcefully-to persuade the parties before
him to come to an agreement and settle their disputes amicably. Kadis do not rely on
religious exhortations alone, but also press practical considerations into service such
as that sulh may have advantages beyond religious benefits for both parties in that it
can avoid harsh outcomes. As always, however, the kadi must remain completely
impartial, showing no more favor to an affluent party than to an indigent one. He
also must clarify rather than direct.
Id. at 1041-42.
94 See id at 1042.
95 Id.
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approach to dispute resolution than confrontation in an open courtroom.96
This may be why, in the United States, many Muslim-Americans turn to
family or their local imam to resolve disputes through mediation, avoiding
public confrontation and allowing the parties to achieve reconciliation on
their own while preserving long-term relationships of the parties. 97 Often
times, these disputes involve marriage or family conflict.98 Mediation of
these types of family conflicts provides insight into general Muslim
mediation and gives a model for resolving disputes:
In a marriage conflict an attempt should first be made to resolve the
dispute at the family level, before it is aggravated and leads to the
disruption of the matrimonial tie ....
The procedure to be followed is that two persons, one on behalf of each
family, should be nominated to look into the matter together and devise
means whereby the misunderstanding between the spouses may be brought
to an end.
The parties would be free, for instance, to decide that the mediators be
nominated either by the spouses themselves or by the elders of their
respective families or in the absence of close relatives, close friends or other
trusted individuals.
Historically if the dispute was brought in an Islamic court, the courts
used the right to nominate mediators, representing the families of both
parties, before referring the matter for judicial verdict.
96 M. McCary, Bridging Ethical Borders: International Legal Ethics with an Islamic
Perspective, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 289, 318 (2000); see R. Seth Shippee, "Blessed Are the
Peacemakers": Faith-Based Approaches to Dispute Resolution, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 237, 245-49 (2002). The many benefits of mediation are why this is the proposed
method for resolving disputes in Iraq. Arbitration is not as favored as mediation in the
Arab-Muslim world. See, e.g., id. at 248 (commenting that arbitration "has received
mixed reviews in the Muslim community."). Arbitration is more formal, more time
consuming, and gives the parties less opportunity to resolve their disputes jointly than
mediation. See, e.g., MOHAMMED ABU-NIMER, NONVIOLENCE AND PEACE BUILDING IN
ISLAM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 106-07 (2003) (discussing extra procedures required to
make a ruling in arbitration). The shortcoming of negotiation as a method of ADR arises
from the adversarial communication patterns inherent in the process itself. HZKIAS
ASSEFA, MEDIATION OF CIVIL WARS: APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES-THE SUDAN
CONFLICT 7-8 (1987). Negotiations have a tendency to encourage a contest of wills
between the parties. Id. Negotiations make it difficult for parties to compromise and
reach settlements because they can lead to the perception that a party is weak. Id. Direct
negotiations between disputing parties are limited in success. Id.
97 McCary, supra note 96, at 318.
98 See Shippee, supra note 96, at 247.
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The Hanafi and Shafi'i schools of Islamic law are of the opinion that
these individuals normally have no authority to issue a binding verdict. All
they can do is recommend the solution they support, after which the spouses
have the right to accept or reject their recommended solution.
However, if the spouses have nominated the mediators to act on their
behalf in regard to divorce (either Talaq, divorce initiated by the husband,
or Khul, divorce initiated by the wife), they will then be bound by the
verdict of their nominated mediators according to Hanafi or Shafi'i schools.
Other scholars, however, argue that the authority of these
arbitrators/mediators is limited to deciding how the spouses should
reconcile their differences, and it does not extend to the annulment of
marriage.
A third group of scholars thinks the mediators have full authority both
in respect of reconciliation and annulment of marriage. 99
The dominance of Islamic law in structuring how Muslims resolve
disputes among themselves, coupled with the various schools of
interpretation on Islamic law, presents the need for non-Islamic parties to
have at least an understanding of the role that Islam plays in dispute
resolution. o0 0 This is in direct opposition to Anglo-American society, where
parties will not likely follow the Bible, or procedures in the Bible, for
resolving disputes. 1 1 Accordingly, non-Islamic parties seeking to resolve a
dispute with a Muslim, or between Muslims, need to understand their own
99 See Basics of Family Conflict Resolution in Islam (consolidating discussion from
Syed Abul Ala Maududi, TowARDs UNDERSTANDING THE QURAN (Zafar Ishaq Ansari
ed., 1988)), available at
http://www.soundvision.coninfo/marriage/conflict/islamicview.asp (last visited Sept.
20, 2004). This passage highlights the prevalence of mediation as a tool for private
dispute resolution in the Muslim world, and demonstrates the complexity of dispute
resolution between Muslims. See also Muhammad Faour, Conflict Management Within
the Muslim Arab Family: Observations and Three Case Studies, in CONFLICT
RESOLUTION IN THE ARAB WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS 175,183-86 (Paul Salem ed., 1997)
(discussing the preferred use of mediators to resolve inter-family disputes between Arab
Muslims). Faour also discusses court-annexed mediation and arbitration to resolve
conflict between Arab Muslim spouses. Id.
100 See discussion supra Part II.
101 See Irani & Funk, supra note 75, at 181 (noting that in a mediated conflict,
"Western [parties rely] on a secular idiom, guidelines from a special field, and personal
experience .... "). But cf. Hizkias Assefa, Peace and Reconciliation as a Paradigm: A
Philosophy of Peace and Its Implications for Conflict, Governance and Economic
Growth in Africa, in PEACEMAKING AND DEMOCRATISATION IN AFRICA: THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES AND CHURCH INITIATIVES 42-71 (Hizkias Assefa & George Wachira eds.,
1996) (providing a holistic general framework for looking at peacemaking in Africa, and
a discussion of reconciliation and conflict resolution as viewed in Christian theology).
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system of dispute resolution and how it differs from Islamic dispute
resolution methods.
III. CULTURAL NORMS OF AMERICAN AND MUSLIM MEDIATION
Mediation can play a powerful role in resolving disputes in Iraq between
Iraqis and Americans, but it is important to understand the similarities and
differences between American and Muslim mediation norms. This Note is
directed towards the American military and American governmental and
non-governmental agencies and is, thus, focused on American norms because
they are more readily identifiable than "Western" norms. 102
A. American Mediation Norms: "Individualist" and "Low-Context"
In order to define American norms in mediations, one has to make the
cultural assumption that America is an "individualist" or a "low-context"
society. 103 Some of the characteristics of this type of society are a capitalistic
economy, nuclear family domination (one or two parents and a small number
of children), urbanization and industrialization, and a tradition of
102 It is hoped that this Note can assist Americans, especially military members, to
resolve disputes with Iraqis. For excellent discussions on the "Americanization" of
international dispute resolution, see the 2002 Symposium Issue of the Ohio State Journal
on Dispute Resolution, The Americanization of International Dispute Resolution, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1-282 (2003). A common theme throughout this issue of the
journal is that American norms in dispute resolution, particularly the focus on procedure,
are influencing the conduct of dispute resolution worldwide. For another synopsis of
differences between the American legal system and the rest of the world, see William B.
Ewald, What's So Special About American Law?, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1083 (2001).
103 "People in low-context cultures prefer to communicate directly. Meaning is on
the surface of the message. Information is explicit, without nuance, and relatively
context-free." JEANNE M. BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY: How TO NEGOTIATE DEALS,
RESOLVE DISPUTES, AND MAKE DECISIONS ACROSS CULTURAL BOUNDARIES 20-21
(2001); Walter A. Wright, Mediation of Private United States-Mexico Commercial
Disputes: Will it Work?, 26 N.M. L. REV. 57, 61 (1996) (discussing the benefits of using
mediation as a counterbalance to arbitration's adversarial nature in resolving U.S.-
Mexico commercial disputes). Wright examines cultural influences on mediation in the
United States, Mexico, and other Latin American countries, and suggests that
understanding the cultural norms of each country might allow ADR professionals to take
advantage of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) opportunities to develop
more mutually beneficial dispute resolution processes. Id.; see also Irani & Funk, supra
note 75, at 171-73 (assessing the applicability of Western approaches to dispute
resolution to Arab-Islamic dispute resolution norms).
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individualist thinking and action. 104  Some consequences of these
characteristics are that individuals feel responsibility for their own economic
destinies, there are opportunities to question authority, freedom of the press
is dominant, and the political system is balanced and stable.105 As a result,
individuals focus on their rights and responsibilities as individuals, and
conflict arises when there are perceived infringements of individuals'
rights.10 6 These characteristics of an individualist or low-context society lead
to a preference for directness, specificity, frankness in stating demands,
confrontation, and open self-disclosure when resolving disputes. 10 7
Individualists initially resolve disputes by negotiating directly with their
perceived adversaries following the aforementioned preferences.' 08
Individualists prefer direct negotiation as an initial dispute resolution
mechanism, and they do not usually bring in third-party mediators until
direct negotiations fail. 1° 9
The involvement of a mediator changes the dynamics of a negotiation,
but individualist cultural preferences continue to influence the mediation. In
the American model, mediation is a formal process with a defined structure
for discussing issues, which provides stability and channels the parties
104 Wright, supra note 103, at 61.
105 Id. at 61-62.
106 Id. at 62; see also Abu-Nimer, supra note 73, at 130-31 (describing assumptions
regarding conflict resolution in the Western context).
107 DAVID W. AUGSBURGER, CONFLICT MEDIATION ACROSS CuLTuREs: PATHWAYS
AND PATTERNS 28 (1992). Walter A. Wright, in his article, explains the usefulness of
Augsburger's work in this way:
At the outset of a discussion of any nation's culture, particularly that of the
United States, it is important to acknowledge that cultural diversity exists. In the
United States, a nation of immigrants, the universe of cultural values is as diverse as
the peoples who inhabit the Earth; there is no single negotiating style or universally
accepted dispute resolution method. Having said that, it is equally important to
acknowledge that dominant U.S. cultural values affect a preponderance of U.S.
negotiating styles and constitute the foundation on which most U.S. mediation
models are built.
Wright, supra note 103, at 61 n.24. In the United States, "indirect language is strongly
disliked; 'straight from the shoulder' talk is admired. 'Get to the point' is the heartfelt
reaction to small talk and evasive formulations." Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across
Cultures, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT 472 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2001).
108 Wright, supra note 103, at 62.
109 Id.
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towards constructive goals. 10 The mediator and the individual prefer direct
confrontation and communication, and the mediator facilitates the session by
establishing "rules of speaking" that control and direct the flow of
communications. 1 The mediation is a structured, task-oriented, and goal-
directed process that seeks to reach agreement on issues by focusing on the
autonomy and individualism of each party's choices, goals, and
satisfactions.112 The mediator is a technical specialist who has a professional,
anonymous, and impersonal relationship with the parties, and once the
parties reach an agreement, the mediator is out of their lives.113 These
characteristics of American mediation are almost entirely different from what
is found in Muslim culture, and it is thus important to understand Arab-
Muslim theoretical norms to find a common ground for resolving disputes
between the two cultures.
B. Muslim Mediation Norms: "Collectivist" and "High-Context"
In the Arab-Muslim world, the cultural assumption is that people are
"collectivist" and "high-context." 114 Collectivist cultures are found in
countries with non-capitalist economies and lower industrial and economic
110 AUGSBURGER, supra note 107, at 204 tbl. 10; DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING
LEGAL DIsPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS 4 (1996)
(describing mediation as "a process in which a neutral person, the mediator, helps people
involved in a dispute to negotiate effectively with each other"); GARY GOODPASTER, A
GUIDE TO NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION 203 (1997) ("Mediation is a problem-solving
negotiation process in which an outside, impartial, neutral party works with disputants to
assist them to reach a satisfactory negotiated agreement."); see also Abu-Nimer, supra
note 73, at 132 (describing the main features of Western third party interventions); Diane
LeResche, Comparison of the American Mediation Process with a Korean-American
Harmony Restoration Process, 9 MEDIATION Q. 323, 326-28 (1992) (offering a
comparison between the formal mediation process used by community-based mediation
centers in the United States and the informal process for handling conflicts used by
Korean-Americans).
111 AUGSBURGER, supra note 107, at 204, tbl. 10.
112 Id.
13 Id.
114 Persons in high-context cultures "prefer to communicate indirectly. Meaning is
embedded in the context of the message and must be inferred to be understood." BRETr,
supra note 103, at 20; Mitchell R. Hammer, Negotiating Across the Cultural Divide:
Intercultural Dynamics in Crisis Incidents, in DYNAMIC PROCESSES OF CRISIS
NEGOTIATION: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 105, 110 (Randall G. Rogan et al.
eds., 1997) (relying on EDWARD T. HALL, BEYOND CULTURE (1976) to identify Arab
cultures as high-context).
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development."l 5 Other characteristics of collectivist cultures are a smaller
degree of social mobility, a weaker middle class, and a dominance of
extended families or tribal structures with families containing larger numbers
of children. 116 Some of the consequences of these characteristics are low
occupational mobility, less income equality throughout the economy, fewer
opportunities to question authority, reduced or nonexistent freedom of the
press, and "less balanced and more unstable" political systems.' 17
Collectivists tend to place greater value on the cultural norms of the primary
groups they belong to and on compliance with those cultural norms.1 18
Within these groups, collectivism and harmony are valued, and the interests
of individuals may be sacrificed or subordinated for the benefit of the
group. 119 Because of the emphasis on harmony, collectivists tend to work
through communications and relationships in an indirect, ambiguous, non-
confrontational, cautious, and subtle way. 120 When criticism is required, it is
given "cautiously and indirectly in order to 'save the face' of the criticism's
recipient."'121 Because it threatens group harmony, conflict is often viewed
negatively, and it is often ignored in the hope that it will settle itself. 122
Conflict can be seen as an instrument of preserving the status quo rather
than as a device of social change, and it often arises in collectivist cultures
when there is a perceived violation of group norms. 123 Compared to
115 Wright, supra note 103, at 64.
116 Id. at 64-65 (citing GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES:
INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK-RELATED VALUES 148-75 (abr. ed. 1984)).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 65 (citing AUGSBURGER, supra note 107, at 28).
119 Id.; see also John Ford, Cross Cultural Conflict Resolution in Teams,
MEDIATE.CoM (Oct. 2001) (providing a brief overview of individualism, collectivism,
and the role of mediators in resolving conflicts across these types of cultures), available
at http://mediate.com/articles/ford5.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2004).
120 AUGSBURGER, supra note 107, at 28. In a high-context culture, speakers "feel
acutely uncomfortable about delivering a blunt no. They want to please others and prefer
inaccuracy and evasion to painful precision: the substantive element of a message, though
elliptical and encoded, will be unmistakable to insiders." Cohen, supra note 107, at 472.
121 Wright, supra note 103, at 65 (citing AUGSBURGER, supra note 107, at 33). Face
is "people's image of themselves." ROXANE S. LULOFS & DUDLEY D. CAHN, CONFLICT:
FROM THEORY TO ACTION 294 (2d ed. 2000).
122 Wright, supra note 103, at 65; see also Abu-Nimer, supra note 73, at 131
(describing social and cultural assumptions that influence Middle Eastern conflict
resolution processes and stating that, in Arab-Muslim communities, "conflict is negative"
and "should be avoided").
123 Wright, supra note 103, at 65.
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individualistic cultures, where direct confrontation is preferred, collectivist
cultures rely on third-party mediators for objectivity, experience, balancing
of power, witnesses to attest to the validity of the process, and, perhaps most
importantly, to protect face and honor.124 Neutrality of the mediator is not a
primary concern, and there is a trend towards seeking out respected members
of the disputant's social network who have familiarity with the context of the
dispute. 125 Using an insider as a mediator allows greater insight into potential
solutions to the conflict and gives the mediator an interest in the outcome.
126
Mediators in collectivist cultures are generally not specialists and act
informally without compensation. 127 Communications between the parties
are informal and indirect, and oftentimes the conflict may be resolved
without the parties ever meeting face to face.' 28 The parties may request
advice from the mediator as to how the dispute should be resolved.' 29 Once
the dispute is resolved, it is normally not reduced to writing, and the parties
will likely maintain contact with the mediator. 130
C. The Significant Differences Between American and Muslim
Mediation Norms
There are two important concepts that are imperative to understanding
the difference between Arab-Muslim and American mediation. First, in each
culture, why are the parties using a mediator? In the Muslim culture, which
places a high value on honor, dignity, and self-respect, mediation allows the
parties to avoid public confrontation in a courtroom. 131 In the American
culture, mediation allows the parties to avoid the courtroom as well, but for
124 AUGSBURGER, supra note 107, at 33; see also Abu-Nimer, supra note 73, at 132
(detailing the unique features of a Middle Eastern mediation as the importance of
credibility and gaining access to the conflict and listing the characteristics of a Middle
Eastern mediation).
125 Wright, supra note 103, at 65.
126 Id. at 65-66.
127 Id. at 66.
128 Id.
129 Id.
13 0 Id.
131 See discussion supra notes 96, 121, 124.
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different reasons. In America, mediation is viewed as a cheaper, faster, and
less formal process than litigation. 132
Second, in each culture, what is the role of the mediator: How do the
parties view the mediator, and how does the mediator view his or her role?133
As discussed above, Americans are concerned with procedure-fairness,
neutrality, and a process that leads to what is perceived as an acceptable
solution. This prioritization of procedure drives the role of the mediator as a
referee. In contrast, Muslims are concerned with honor and dignity, and,
thus, the mediator is someone who can help resolve the conflict while
maintaining honor and group harmony. 134 Understanding these two concepts,
and the differences that arise between American and Arab-Muslim
mediation, allows us to develop a solution to mediating conflicts in Iraq
between the predominantly Muslim Iraqis and the predominantly American
reconstructionists. This solution is based on theory and the experience of
ADR in other countries such as Bangladesh, China, and South Korea.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR MEDIATING DISPUTES IN IRAQ
The foregoing theoretical analysis of individualist, low-context American
mediation and collectivist, high-context Arab-Muslim culture provides broad
generalizations of Americans and Iraqis. Those looking to mediate disputes
in Iraq must keep in mind the diversity of the country. Honor and dignity are
of great importance in Iraq, and that means every person and every dispute
cannot be treated in the same manner. 135 Iraqi Shi'ites, Sunnis, Kurds, and
Christians might all view conflict differently depending on a variety of
factors. This Note attempts to define a starting point for mediation of
disputes between Iraqis and Americans. The author is mindful that actual
132 See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 153-58 (4th ed. 2003) (examining public
encouragement of mediation).
133 For another comparison of Western and Arab-Islamic approaches to dispute
resolution, see Irani & Funk, supra note 75, at 180-81. See also Dania A. Dialdin &
James A. Wall, Jr., Third Parties and Culture, 15 NEGOT. J. 381 (1999) (reporting how
culture influences third-party intervention and examining why culture has an effect on
third-party processes).
134 See AUGSBURGER, supra note 107, at 193. "In the Middle East, mediation is a
process of resolving and minimizing interpersonal conflict that is intimately connected to
the social fabric of people's everyday lives." Id. (quoting CATHIE WrrrY, MEDIATION
AND SOCIETY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN LEBANON 6 (1980)).
135 See discussion infra note 136.
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experience will provide a more detailed model of how to mediate disputes in
Iraq.
A. Recommended Steps for Mediation
1. Identify Which Approach (Individualist or Collectivist) is
Appropriate
The first step in mediating disputes is to identify which approach
(individualist or collectivist) to use. 136 There are no statistics to tell us what
percentage of Iraqis are collectivist or individualist, but it is probably safe to
assume that the majority of Iraqis are collectivist. 137 Also noteworthy is the
136 See Wright, supra note 103, at 73-74. Although Wright's work focuses on using
U.S. mediation models to resolve commercial disputes between U.S. and Mexican
citizens, the general approach provides a useful basis with which to begin. See also Abu-
Nimer, supra note 73, at 123-41. Those seeking to mediate a dispute should examine the
local customs of dispute resolution before implementing a new program. Id. at 124. Abu-
Nimer advises those seeking to resolve conflict in the Middle East to
be aware of, investigate, and understand the existing procedures of conflict
resolution which have been implemented in the local community. In the Middle
East, adopting such a perspective means the acceptance and recognition of the
proposition that Islam and Islamic societies contain beliefs, customs, attitudes, and a
history which can serve as rich bases for identifying constructive conflict resolution
frameworks and processes.
Id. at 124-25.
137 See Hammer, supra note 114, at 110 (categorizing Arab society as collectivist or
high-context); see also George E. Irani, Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East
Conflicts, 3 MIDDLE EAST R. INT'L AFF. 1 (June 1999), available at
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue2/irani.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2004) (reviewing
traditional Islamic techniques for resolving disputes and encouraging conciliation as tools
applicable to contemporary regional conflicts). Irani identifies Iraq as an Arab Middle
East country dominated by the "powerful role patriarchy plays in decisionmaking." Id. at
7. While making this cultural assumption allows some simplicity in this analysis, one
should not assume that homogeneity exists within the Iraqi culture. There are six ideas to
keep in mind when studying culture and conflict resolution in Iraq. ABU-NIMER, supra
note 96, at 8. First, "there are many internal paradoxes and subcultures within every
Muslim community." Id. Second, "Islamic culture is not a 'thing' that can be reified into
a single object or dimension." Id. Third, "Islamic culture is not uniformly distributed
among all Muslims or members of a Muslim community." Id. Fourth, a Muslim may
"possess[] many subcultural identities at the same time." Id. Fifth, tradition is but one of
the factors in Islamic dispute resolution. Id. Sixth, "the values, norms, and practices of
Muslims may keep their form but change dramatically in significance over time." Id.; see,
e.g., Kevin Avruch, What Do 1 Need to Know About Culture? A Researcher Says.. . , in
A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE BUILDING: INTO THE EYE OF THE STORM 78-86
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seemingly widespread anti-American sentiment of the Iraqis.138 Most
mediations should take a collectivist approach, but those looking to mediate a
conflict should carefully consider an individual disputant's social
characteristics and negotiating preferences before choosing an approach.' 39
One should also remember that mediation in the Middle East is
fundamentally different from American-styled mediation and try not to
confuse the two procedures.
In light of the Iraqi preference for self-determination, the need to "win
the hearts and minds" of Iraqis, and the likelihood that American troops are
not entrenched in American-styled mediation, a collectivist approach to
mediation is favored over an individualistic approach, and this Note follows
(John Paul Lederach & Janice Moomaw Jenner eds., 2002) (telling the reader cultural
traps and miscues to avoid, including oversimplification, stereotyping, and thinking of
culture as prescriptive); James K. Sebenius, Caveats for Cross-Border Negotiators, 18
NEGOT. J. 121-33 (2002) (suggesting that cross-cultural analysis is susceptible to four
fallacies, including stereotyping, over-attribution, skewed perceptions and information
processing, and "when in Rome, do as the Romans do.").
138 See Edward Wong, New Pressures over U.S. Plan for Iraqi Rule, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2004, at AI; Edward Wong, The Struggle For Iraq: Shiite Protest; Huge March
Backs Cleric Over U.S. Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2004, at A10; Thousands Demonstrate
Against Coalition Forces in Iraq (CNN Live Today broadcast, Jan. 15,2004). Thousands
of Iraqis gathered in massive demonstrations in January 2004 to protest the American
plan to implement caucus-style elections in the election of the transitional Iraqi National
Assembly. Id.; see also discussion infra note 160.
139 Wright, supra note 103, at 73. American-styled mediation should be developed
and offered as a choice. For a thorough and excellent reference on American mediation,
see JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE (2001); GOLANN, supra
note 110. But see Sally Engle Merry, Mennonite Peacebuilding and Conflict
Transformation: A Cultural Analysis, in FROM THE GROUND UP: MENNONITE
CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACEMAKING 203, 208-10 (Cynthia Sampson &
John Paul Lederach eds., 2000) (noting that one of the distinctive features of Mennonite
mediators was to empower others to resolve the dispute, and emphasizing how this
practice runs counter to the mediation culture in the United States). If American-styled
mediation were developed in Iraq, it would seem wise to follow the Mennonite practice
of empowering Iraqis to use the process to resolve disputes, rather than having the
American mediators wielding control over mediations. By not taking charge in using
American-styled mediation, Americans could show a respect for the Iraqis and their
culture. Id. at 209. Put another way, during training, Americans should work on changing
their view from one of providing expertise to a role of accompanying discovery. Id.
Information about American mediation can be passed to Iraqis by demonstrating the
model to professional organizations, providing courses of instruction at universities and
other institutions of higher learning, and using the Iraqi media to promote its use. See
Wright, supra note 103, at 73. Education could facilitate understanding and use of the
American model of mediation by Iraqis.
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that assumption. 140 Using this type of approach could offer a few advantages
to both Iraqis and non-Iraqis. It could give the mediation a sense of
legitimacy by using a method with which Iraqis are familiar. Using a
collectivist-styled mediator (including trusted and respected Muslim clerics
and educators) should also lend credibility to the process and outcome, which
could enhance trust between Iraqis and Americans. 14 1 Allowing Iraqi citizens
to use an approach with which they are familiar could help promote friendlier
relations with Americans and other non-Muslims. Using this type of
mediation could help promote the idea that reconstructionists are in Iraq to
help rebuild the country and re-establish Iraqi self-determination, and not to
develop an American colony. 142 For non-Iraqis, this approach could facilitate
140 See discussion supra note 138.
141 The current Iraqi sentiment towards American forces was recently expressed by
Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar, deputy chief of one of Iraq's largest Sunni tribes, a former member
of the Iraqi Governing Council, and President of Iraq's Interim Government:
The United States is using excessive power... [t]hey round up people in a very
humiliating way, by putting bags over their faces in front of their families. In our
society, this is like rape. The Americans are using collective punishment by jailing
relatives. What is the difference from Saddam? They are demolishing houses now.
They say they want to teach a lesson to the people .... You cannot win the hearts
and minds of the people by using force. What's the difference between dictatorship
and what's happening now?
Peter Maass, Professor Nagl's War: Can The Lessons of History Help Defeat the
Insurgency in Iraq? Dodging Bullets, Taking Prisoners and Trying to Win Hearts and
Minds, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 11, 2004, at 29. Interestingly, al-Yawar is a moderate who
wants to see the American occupation succeed. Id.
142 See id. at 28. One Army major in Iraq expressed his feelings by stating:
Across this divide they're looking at us, we're looking at them from behind
barbed wire, and they're trying to understand why we're here, what we want from
them. Almost inconceivable to a lot of them, I think, that what we want for them is
the right to make their own decisions, to live free lives. It's probably hard to
understand that if you have lived your entire life under Saddam Hussein's rule. And
it's hard for us to convey that message, particularly given the fact that few of us
speak Arabic.
Id.; see, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER 247-52 (1996) (describing the ideological "clash" between America
and Muslim nations in the Persian Gulf during the Persian Gulf War. Huntington details
the prevailing anti-American sentiment in the Arab world); see also Abu-Nimer, supra
note 73, at 135 (warning that Middle Easterners may perceive dispute resolution
processes that are associated with Western governmental and nongovernmental agencies
with antagonism and skepticism); Steven R. Weisman, A Foreign Policy of Try, Try
Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at D5 (describing the American occupation in Iraq as
"one of relentless trial and error."). Weisman also compares the U.S. efforts in Iraq to
earlier efforts in the Philippines, Germany, and Japan. Id.
515
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
understanding of the Iraqi culture, one that is baffling to many Americans. 143
In sum, choosing the collectivist approach to mediation should have many
benefits to both Iraqis and non-Iraqis. The next step is structuring the
mediation to ensure fairness and legitimacy to both sides.
2. Selection of the Mediator(s)
Assuming that most mediations will have a collectivist, high-context
character to them allows us to concentrate on the essential step of selecting
the mediator(s). Fairness in this process is likely a primary concern to both
sides. Iraqis will want a mediator that they know (either personally or
through reputation) and respect. 144 Americans, or other foreigners, will
probably consider the use of a fellow outsider as the only means of
143 See John Tierney, Baffled Occupiers, or the Missed Understandings, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2003, at A4. This article truly highlights the need for an understanding of
the collectivist, high-context Iraqi culture. American soldiers can identify with the fact
that preserving personal and family honor is of supreme importance to Iraqis, but they are
largely unable to understand why this is so, and worse yet, because Iraqi culture is
"unfathomable" to American soldiers, they routinely offend Iraqis by "plunging bluntly
into business instead of paying respects to the [Iraqi] and asking questions about his well-
being and that of his family." Id. The importance of honor in Arab-Muslim society cannot
be understated, and it must be addressed in the mediation. ABu-NIMER, supra note 96, at
98 (identifying values associated with Muslim tribal dispute resolution, including honor,
saving face, valor, wisdom, generosity, respect, dignity, and forgiveness).
Americans and other non-Arab Muslims seeking to resolve or mediate a dispute with
an Iraqi must understand this important concept and act appropriately in order to make
the mediation effective. To use an example from the Tierney article, say that American
soldiers catch an Iraqi, who reeks of alcohol, breaking into a liquor store in the middle of
the night. To the Americans, the reason why the man was breaking into the liquor store is
obvious-to obtain more alcohol. The Iraqi man and his family will swear that he was
just going into the store to do some work for a friend, and that the man would never drink
alcohol because it is forbidden by the Qu'ran. Instead of getting into a heated discussion
and telling the Iraqi man and his family that he is lying, the American soldiers might
want to contact the man's inam or family elder and explain the situation to him. The
soldiers could tell the Iraqi man that they understand that he does not want to bring shame
to his family, and the soldiers could work with the man and his imam or elder to develop
a solution where the Iraqi man is punished and accepts responsibility, yet is able to keep
from disclosing the offense to his family at all.
144 See Irani, supra note 137, at 5 ("[I]n Arab culture in general, the mediator is
perceived as someone having all the answers and solutions... 'if [the mediator] does not
provide the answers, he or she is not really respected or considered to be legitimate."');
see, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 141, at 291-98 (discussing the resolution of large-
scale conflict through mediation and the importance of using secondary and tertiary
parties with recognized legitimacy to help bridge cultural gaps).
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guaranteeing a fair outcome. In some instances, there may be a local imam,
mayor, tribal elder, foreign worker, or American military member that both
Iraqis and Americans respect. 145 If this is the case, then both sides should be
able to agree on the mediator. Each village, or other identifiable local area,
could have a standing mediation committee of about ten people. The standing
committee should be a diverse mix of well-respected Iraqis, American
military members, and foreign aid workers. 146 The parties could choose their
mediator from persons on the committee. The problem that will arise is when
neither disputant can agree on a mediator.
In instances where the disputants cannot agree on a single mediator, a
mediation committee could conduct the mediation. Disputants have used
mediation committees to resolve disputes with success in a number of
145 For a discussion of some characteristics of a mediator, see ASSEFA, supra note
96, at 22-25. Assefa identifies seven prerequisites for a mediator: impartiality,
independence, respect, knowledge and skill, possession of required physical resources,
international support, and leverage. Id. at 22-23. Although Assefa's work addresses
mediation between protagonist parties in a civil war, the general principles would apply
to mediating disputes in Iraq. Assefa also identifies the importance of leverage as a
controversial issue. Id. at 23. The ability to apply leverage to a party could be very
effective in Iraq-a mayor or imam might be able to apply some sort of pressure to force
an Iraqi to accept or reject a proposal. As applied to non-Iraqis like the American
military, leverage could be less effective because members of the military take directives
from higher commanders. If a high-ranking officer or official tells a subordinate to accept
or reject a proposal, the subordinate will have to follow the directive (unless it is an
unlawful order). One should take notice of Assefa's belief that leverage should not be
used "automatically," and that a mediator should exercise "vigorous restraint" in using
leverage to avoid casting "doubts upon the neutrality of the mediator." Id. at 23; see also
ABU-NIMER, supra note 96, at 95-96 ("Mediators often use their kinship connections as a
tool to exert pressure and gain access when they negotiate with certain parties to the
conflict."). Abu-Nimer also describes the effectiveness of using respected elders as
mediators because they are "entrusted to discern the underlying causes of conflict and
balance the longer-term interests of the community with the weight, motives, and
contexts of the conflict." Id. at 96. An Arab-Muslim in a dispute will obey his elders in
accepting or rejecting a settlement. Id. at 103.
146 In some Iraqi cities, there are similar committees acting as city councils. Robert
Hodierne, 'This Place is Crazy;' In Fallujah, It's Not IF You'll Get Shot at, But When,
ARMY TIMEs, Mar. 1, 2004, at 25. In Fallujah, the Fallujah Provisional Authority
Commission ("F-Pac") was comprised of sheiks, imams, businessmen, doctors, an Army
battalion commander, and the local CPA representative, who is a U.S. State Department
veteran. Id. Americans carefully selected the members to ensure that a balance was struck
between tribal, religious, and professional leaders in the community. Id. The F-Pac had
41 members, but the notion behind the careful selection of the committee could serve as a
guide for a smaller mediation committee. Id.
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cases. 147 For small disputes, the mediation committee should have three
persons; for larger disputes, there may be up to nine persons. 148 Each party
147See CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ALTERNATIVE DisPuTE RESOLUTION PRACTITIONERS'
GUIDE App. B, 1-13 (Mar. 1998), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/our-Work/demociacy-and-govemance/publications/pdfs/pnacb895
.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2004) (using a community mediation program in Bangladesh as
an example of how to increase access to justice for disadvantaged rural groups, especially
women). Each village has a mediation committee of eight to ten people. Id. The
committee members are chosen in consultation with the elites of-a given village: "socially
influential people, teachers, elected officials, social workers, the imam, or religious
leader." Id at 3. Not all committee members are present at each mediation, due to work
and family- obligations, but they are encouraged to attend when possible. Id. Most often,
the most respected elder acts as the chairperson. Id.. Surveys indicate that satisfaction
with this type of committee mediation is quite high. Id. at 4-5; Deborah Chow, Note,
Development of China's Legal System Will Strengthen its Mediation Programs, 3
CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 4 (2002) (discussing the use of People's Mediation
Committees in China).
Each village is entitled to establish a mediation committee. Id. The local committees
consist of three to nine persons elected by the village. Id. The role of the committee
members is to investigate and analyze the facts, talk to the disputing parties, help the
parties understand the facts, and attempt to. have the parties reach an, agreement. Id.;
Robert Perkovich, A Comparative Analysis of Community Mediation in the United States
and the People's Republic of China, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 313, 319-27 (1996)
(discussing the use of People's Mediation Committees in China and offering a
comparison to community mediation in the U.S.). For another article providing an
excellent overview of the function of mediation committees in China, see Kwang-Taeck
Woo, A Comparison of Court-Connected Mediation in Florida and Korea, 22 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 605, 613-14 (1997) (discussing the types of mediation agencies in Korea and
describing the use of mediation committees). A mediation committee consists of two
neutral non-judge commissioners and one judge who chairs the committee. Id. at 614.
The commissioners are selected by the chairman from an approved commissioners' list.
Id. The general recommendation is that the commissioners have some special knowledge
and experience in particular fields because their expertise can be persuasive in helping
the disputants reach an agreement. Id.; Martin Wright, Peace Committees in Troubled
Communities, Mediate.com (Feb. 2004), available at
http://www.mediate.com/articles/wrightMl.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2004) (describing
the use of peace committees in some deprived areas of Cape Town, South Africa as a sort
of community restorative justice' project). The idea of the peace committee may be
practical for use in Iraq, but for the purposes of this article, the use of a committee and a
facilitator is what is most important. The committee invites the disputants for an
interview, typically 'within two days. Id.; see also ABU-NIMER, supra note 96, at 97
(describing the framework of using councils to resolve disputes among Palestinians,
particularly in murder cases).
148 The reason for having at least three members on the committee is to have a "tie-
breaker." In Bangladesh, China, and Korea, there are up to nine mediators on a
518
[Vol. 20:2 2005]
ADR IN THE NEW IRAQ
would choose a mediator, and then the parties could choose the third
mediator. If neither party could agree on a mediator, they could agree to
allow their chosen mediators to choose the third mediator. The parties could
appoint a chairperson of the committee, or the mediators could appoint the
chairperson of the committee from amongst themselves. Once the disputants
agree to the composition of the committee, the next important step is the
mediation itself.
3. Conducting the Mediation
Once the disputants have selected the mediator or the mediation
committee, the next step is for the mediator(s) to talk with each disputing
party and gather the facts. 149 The mediator(s) should initially meet each
disputant outside the presence of the other party. During this time, the
mediator(s) should work diligently to establish trust and confidence in the
mediator(s) and in the mediation. 150 The mediator(s) should determine the
disputants' desired outcomes and begin to formulate alternative solutions to
committee. See discussion of mediation committees supra note 147. This seems likely to
lead to a breakdown in efficiency for small disputes. However, the disputants, or local
mediation committee, should, as needed, always have the ability to appoint more people
to a mediation committee. Id.
149 See Irani, supra note 137, at 12-13; CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND
GOVERNANCE, supra note 147, at 3-4. Fact-finding and allowing the disputants to tell
their story are "a major focus of the mediation process." Id. at 3. The parties should be
permitted to bring anyone they choose to the mediation for support and credibility. Id.
Permitting parties to bring friends or relatives might be particularly useful when the
disputant is a female. Id. Parties should be given as much time as possible to tell their
side of the story. Id. at 4. In instances where there is an imbalance of honor, the mediator
must address the honor issue before developing compromises on substantive issues. ABU-
NIMER, supra note 96, at 96.
150 See AUGSBURGER, supra note 107, at 194-200 (describing the various roles of
the mediator, including encouraging positive communication and interaction, and
establishing bases of personal interaction, trust in goodwill and negotiability, and a base
of continuing relationships); LtJLOFS & CAHN, supra note 121, at 348 (enunciating the
basic communication skills that are required of a mediator, including the necessity of the
mediator building confidence in the mediation process). In order for this sulh-like
mediation to work effectively, the mediator should ensure that both parties are convinced
that harmony is better than victory, that the mediator is essential, and that the mediation
is intended to lead to reconciliation and social harmony. ABU-NIMER, supra note 96, at
96. Another consideration in these mediations is language. Mediators will need to work
diligently to make sure interpretations are done correctly. See, e.g., Raymond Cohen,
Resolving Conflict Across Languages, 17 NEGOT. J. 17-34 (2001) (exploring the role of
language in negotiations to resolve international and cross-cultural conflict).
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the problem.'15 Once the mediator has a grasp of the nature of the dispute
and the parties' desired remedies, and has formulated some possible
solutions, she should decide whether bringing the parties together to discuss
the dispute is appropriate. 152 If the mediator does not bring the parties
together, the mediator should continue to work with each side to reach a
solution. 153 If the mediator is able to bring the parties together, the mediator
should review the proposed agreement with the parties and may facilitate a
problem solving session if there are still open issues.1 54
In cases where a mediation committee is necessary, the committee
should follow the same steps detailed above, but the mediation committee
may need to meet on its own to discuss possible solutions before bringing the
parties together to reach an agreement. In cases where the nature of the
dispute or conflict is larger and continuous, the mediation may become more
151 ABU-NIMER, supra note 96, at 101 (the mediator should aim "to have the parties
propose and accept a resolution by appealing to the good that resides in all parties.").
When working with the Iraqi party, the mediator may want to appeal to the spiritual
beliefs of the Iraqi by relying on sayings of the Prophet that focus on the superiority of
forgiveness and reconciliation. Id. at 100-01.
152 Id. at 104. Some Muslim mediators argue that because "anger clouds people's
judgment," they can control the mediation better by not letting the parties meet, often
saving the parties potential humiliation or commitment to inflexible positions. Id. One
Palestinian mediator gives the parties three days to consider the initial meeting before
discussing any resolution. Id. at 101; see also Berenson, supra note 8, at A18 (describing
how an imam in Basra brought two disputing Iraqi tribes together to mediate an ongoing
feud). At one point, the mediation fell into disorder as the parties began yelling at each
other, and the imam took three leaders from each tribe into his office. Id. The process the
imam used, including ordering a five-day truce, gives insight into traditional Arab-
Muslim mediation. Id.
153 In most Arab-Muslim dispute resolution settings, the role of the mediator is to
bring the parties to agreement. ABU-NIMER, supra note 96, at 103. The mediator does not
necessarily need to address "structural injustices or institutional arrangements underlying
the conflict." Id. If an Iraqi party raises the issue of these perceived injustices, the
mediator might remind the party to accept an offered agreement because they are not
going to change the world, nor will they get better compensation. Id.
154 AUGSBURGER, supra note 107, at 200 ("People are more likely to adhere to
agreements they have helped form than to those imposed by external authorities.");
BERTRAM I. SPECTOR, POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, CONFLICT, AND DIsPUTE RESOLUTION 9-
10, available at
http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracy-and-governance/publications/ipc/wp- 11-
ms.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2004). For an overview of how to "invent options for mutual
gain," see ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WrrHouT GIVING IN 56-80 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991); GOODPASTER, supra note
110, at 211-13.
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of a conflict resolution process. 155 Once the parties have reached a
consensus, the mediator should ensure that all details of the agreement,
including reconciliation, are complete.' 56 The importance of reconciliation in
Arab-Muslim society should lead the mediator to ensure that some form of
reconciliation will occur between the parties.
4. Reconciliation
In traditional Arab-Muslim dispute resolution, once the parties reach a
settlement, the two sides agree to conduct a sulhah, or public reconciliation
session. 157 The ritual is as much a symbolic expression of the parties'
reconciliation as it is an actual acceptance of settlement between the
parties. 158 For an American or other non-Iraqi, this ritual is unusual and may
155 For one approach of conflict resolution, see Ronald J. Fisher, Social-
Psychological Processes in Interactive Conflict Analysis and Reconciliation, in CONFLICT
RESOLUTION: DYNAMICS, PROCESS AND STRUCTURE 81-104 (Ho-Won Jeong ed., 1999).
Fisher promotes a process called "Interactive Conflict Resolution" or ICR. Id. at 82.
Important to ICR is a problem-solving workshop that brings together "a small number of
participants (typically four or five from each side) with a third-party panel of skilled
scholar-practitioners (typically three to five) for intensive discussions focusing on the
nature of the conflict (typically for three to five days)." Id. at 86. This approach would
work best in larger, more complicated and intense disputes and conflicts. The third-party
panel could consist of U.N. workers or other international workers and scholars.
156 A vital aspect in the process of sulh is letting parties vent their frustrations and
address the importance of continuing their relationship. Abu-Nimer, supra note 73, at
136. Once the parties have settled their dispute, the focus is on conciliation. Irani & Funk,
supra note 75, at 184.
157 ABU-NIMER, supra note 96, at 98-102. Reconciliation can either bring people
back into harmony with each other or have a party publicly accept or submit to an
agreement. Louis Kriesberg, Paths to Varieties of Intercommunal Reconciliation, in
CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 155, at 106. Reconciliation can occur between
"individuals, peoples, officials, governments, families, or other groups or various
combinations of them." Id. Reconciliation can serve various purposes, including getting
the parties to acknowledge the dreadful events that occurred between them, recognize and
accept each other's suffering, manifest a belief that wrongs have been redressed, and
proclaim that they anticipate having future peaceful relations. Id. at 107. In Arab-Muslim
society, the most important function of the public ritual is to express the responsibility
and dedication of the parties to the settlement and to the reinstatement of peace and
harmony among the parties. ABU-NMER, supra note 96, at 108.
158 Id. (discussing one ritual in Galilee where an offender had to walk around the
town without his kaffiyah (traditional Arabic headdress), a great humiliation and an act
that sends a message of repentance and helplessness).
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be difficult to accept or comprehend. 159 However, if Americans were to
submit to this process, it could help send a powerful message to local Iraqi
communities. For example, if the settlement favored the Iraqi party, a public
reconciliation could demonstrate that the American party, by submitting to
the mediation and reconciliation, is concerned with justice, honor, and
fairness. If the settlement favored the American party, the reconciliation
ritual could send a message of acceptance by the Iraqis. This demonstration
of acceptance could have several meanings, all of which would promote a
feeling of cooperation and peacefulness by Iraqis.160
159 American mediation is a no-nonsense process that empowers individuals and
allows the parties to reach a solution, forget the past, and move on. Irani & Funk, supra
note 75, at 181.
160 Recent events in Iraq demonstrate an analogous situation to benefits of
reconciliation. The CPA had proposed a system of caucus-style elections for electing
delegates to the Iraqi transitional National Assembly. Archie Tse, In Dispute: The Caucus
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, at Al 1. Many Iraqis, led by the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani, the most important Shiite cleric in Iraq, believed that direct elections were the
best way to elect representative to the transitional National Assembly. Dexter Filkins,
U.N. Team Arrives in Iraq To Study Plans for Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, at
All. Ayatollah Sistani refused to meet with CPA officials, but said that he would meet
with a U.N. team and would seriously weigh the U.N.'s opinion on elections in making
his decision about what ultimate plan he would support. Id. In response, the U.S. asked
the U.N. to intervene. Id. The U.N. sent Lakhdar Brahimi, a well-respected Muslim, to
Iraq to assess the possibility of holding direct elections. Edward Wong, U.N. Envoy,
Visiting Iraq, Backs Cleric on Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A14. When the
U.N. team announced that credible direct elections were not feasible, Ayatollah Sistani
accepted the U.N.'s assessment. Dexter Filkins, Iraqi Ayatollah Insists on Vote by End of
Year, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at Al. Because Ayatollah Sistani, the spiritual leader of
Iraq's Shi'ite Muslims, accepted the U.N. as a legitimate third-party mediator, many
Iraqis also accepted the rejection of direct elections. Id.; see also John F. Bums, Cleric
May Warn Iraqis to Reject New Government, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at A20; Jeffrey
Gettleman, Top Shiite Cleric Recognizes New Interim Iraqi Government, N.Y. TIMES,
June 4, 2004, at A16; Yousseff M. Ibrahim, For Iraq's Shiites, Faith Knows No Borders,
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at A23; Edward Wong, Cleric Tells Fighters and Occupiers
to Leave Sacred Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2004, at A13; Edward Wong, Iraq's Path
Hinges on Words of Enigmatic Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, at Al. Similarly, if an
Iraqi accepts a settlement in mediation as legitimate, other Iraqis might be motivated to
accept mediations as a just way to resolve disputes with Americans. This might help
Iraqis to see the Americans as fair and respectful of Muslim traditions. This could
generate trust and acceptance of the American presence by Iraqis. See also Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Middle East Info. Center, available at
http://middleeastinfo.org/article3861.htm (last updated Jan. 16, 2004) (last visited Sept.
10, 2004) (providing a summary of Ayatollah Sistani, including his background and
views on Iraq).
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In the Middle East, the ritual of public reconciliation generally begins
with both parties lining up across from one another and then exchanging
greetings and accepting apologies. 161 The two parties then shake hands under
the supervision of a muslih or ajaha.162 The offending party visits the home
of the aggrieved, and the ritual concludes with a meal hosted by the
offending party. 163 In the context of a settlement between an Iraqi and an
American, the ritual could be large or small, depending on the nature of the
dispute. 164 One important aspect of the ceremony is the speeches by the
mediators and local leaders, which should explain why the parties have
reached and accepted a settlement. 165 By explaining the agreement, the
mediators and local leaders legitimatize the agreement to the community and
encourage peace, respect, and honor among the parties. 166 Once the
ceremony is concluded, hopefully harmony is restored between the parties,
and the Americans and Iraqis can interact in peace and respect.
161 Irani, supra note 137, at 13.
162 Id. Muslihs or jaha are those who have esteem in the community. See Marc
Gopin, Forgiveness as an Element of Conflict Resolution in Religious Cultures: Walking
the Tightrope of Reconciliation and Justice, in RECONCILIATION, JUSTICE, AND
COEXISTENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 87, 95 (Mohammed Abu-Nimer ed., 2001).
163 Irani, supra note 137, at 13. The exact nature of the ritual varies from place to
place, but "the basic philosophy is based on sulh (settlement), musalaha (reconciliation),
musafaha (hand-shaking), and mumalaha ('partaking of salt and bread,' i.e., breaking
bread together)." Id. at 109.
164 For a minor dispute, the parties could meet at a local government building or
mosque and perform the ceremony under the auspices of the mediator and local Iraqi and
American leaders. For a larger dispute, the parties could conduct the ceremony in a larger
public setting under the supervision of the mediator and more senior Iraqi and American
leaders. If the Americans were the offending party, they should attempt to host a
traditional Iraqi meal, perhaps inviting the aggrieved party to their "home" (forward
operating base) if security concerns are negligible. Otherwise, the Americans could host a
meal in the community.
165 ABU-NIMER, supra note 96, at 108. Religious and cultural values should
permeate their speeches. Id. Because the Iraqis and Americans usually practice different
religions, the speech should emphasize that all parties are the children of God. Id. at 109.
166 See id. at 107-09; see also LULOFS & CAHN, supra note 121, at 293-314
(examining impression management in conflict). Face and honor are important to all
people. Id. Therefore, Americans need to work especially hard to maintain face for the
Iraqis. When face and honor have been threatened, corrective action needs to be taken. Id.
at 297. There are a variety of methods in addressing face, and the Lulofs & Cahn text
provides ample discussion for the mediator.
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B. Unanswered Questions
The use of mediation to resolve disputes in Iraq between Iraqis and
Americans is appealing, but there are some uncertainties about implementing
and using the process. The first problem is convincing Americans and other
non-Iraqis to submit to a style of dispute resolution that is foreign and puts
some control over the outcome into the hands of an Iraqi. To overcome this
issue, Americans must realize that the benefit of using the traditional Arab-
Muslim style of mediation is building trust and faith between Iraqis and
Americans. The key to ensuring fairness lies in selecting the mediators.
This leads to the second problem: the selection of mediators. How do the
parties ensure mediator neutrality? As discussed in Part IV.A above, some
mediator partiality is preferred, but how do the parties ensure that the
mediators are fair? What kind of training do the mediators receive, and who
oversees mediator training? Another important question is determining who
the mediators are. As mentioned in Part IV.A above, potential mediators
include Iraqi tribal leaders, imams, respected professionals, American
military members, and foreign aid workers; the U.N. or other foreign
countries could also provide mediators. This issue leads to the third problem:
Who actually oversees the mediation program?- Agencies that could
implement and supervise the program include the U.N., the U.S. military, or
even a U.S. agency such as the U.S. Agency for International Development.
The fourth problem is ascertaining how the mediation program fits
within the Iraqi legal system. Is the mediation process a designated
alternative to the court system, or is it independent from the courts? Can the
courts order an Iraqi party into the mediation program? Is the mediation
settlement appealable, and if so, where do the parties appeal to? Is there a
larger regional committee that accepts appeals and disputes that the local
mediators cannot resolve? The last question concerns the duration of the
program. Does the program terminate when American military forces leave
Iraq, or does it transition into a permanent mediation program for the Iraqis?
These questions exhibit the need for further development if a mediation
program is to be implemented in Iraq.
V. CONCLUSION
Events in Iraq reveal the need for ADR in that country. The American
occupation of Iraq has been fraught with violence, contentiousness, and
conflict. As Iraq transitions from an oppressed dictatorship to a lawless
disorganized nation to a fully functional democracy, there are many disputes
between the Iraqis and those helping to reconstruct Iraq that require a system
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of ADR. Mediation is a traditional method of dispute resolution between
Iraqis, and Americans and other non-Iraqis would benefit from utilizing
Arab-Muslim mediation techniques. By using traditional Iraqi mediation,
Americans could promote trust and cultural understanding between
themselves and the Iraqis. Mediation could bring peace not only through the
settlement of a dispute, but through the process of reconciliation.
By using Iraqi cultural methods, Americans could exhibit that their sole
purpose in occupying Iraq is returning self-determination to Iraq and could
show a genuine concern for learning about Iraqi culture. The wide cultural
disparity between the Americans and the Iraqis illustrates the need for
foreigners to be aware of cultural norms when working in another country.
Of course, not all norms of a culture will apply to all persons within that
culture, but understanding the generalities of a culture gives us a starting
point when trying to resolve conflict between different parties. In the case of
Iraq, the peculiarities of the situation, namely the American military as a
foreign security force, demonstrates a situation where not just understanding
cultural norms, but also embracing the culture of the other party, can lead to
peace. It is hoped that this Note provides instruction on how Americans
could adopt Iraqi methods of dispute resolution so that the trouble we have
with the Iraqis is not ourselves; after all, it is their country.
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